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INTRODUCTION 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act1 (“ADA”) prohibits 
public entities2 from discriminating against disabled persons.3  Every 
state in the Union has a disabled parking program, but most states 
charge the disabled to recover the costs of implementing and 
maintaining these programs.4  A small percentage of states actually 
 
 ∗ B.A. 2000, The Evergreen State College; J.D. Candidate 2003, Seton Hall Law 
School. 
 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. (2003). 
 2 Public entities include the states and a number of state and local organizations.  
42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2003). 
 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12131 (2003).  “No qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003). 
 4 Thirty-one states charge for parking placards, disabled designated license 
plates, or both disabled placards and license plates (no states require both placards 
and special license plates to participate in their disabled parking programs).  See ALA. 
CODE § 32-6-131 (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-2409 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
42-3-121 (2)(a)(III)(d) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-253(a) (2001); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2135(c) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.0848 (West 2001); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 40-2-74 (2001); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-616 (2001); IND. CODE § 9-14-
5-8 (2001) (assessing a fee for temporary placards only); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1,125 
(2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:463:4 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 
(2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.675 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 169.345 (2002); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 301.142 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 482.384 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
261:88 (2001) (assessing a fee for special license plates, but not for placards); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-206 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-16 (Michie 2001); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 20-37.6 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-01-15 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4503.44 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 112 (West 2002); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 56-3-1960 (Law. Co-op. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-21-103 (2001); TEX. 
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 681.003 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §41-1a-408 (2001); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1241 (Michie 2001); WIS. STAT. § 343.51 (2001).  Nineteen 
states do not charge a fee for disabled parking placards, and charge no fee beyond 
normal licensing fees for disabled designated license plates.  See ALASKA STAT. § 
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charge the disabled much more than the costs of the programs, 
effectively using the program as an additional source of state 
revenue.5  The policy issue in this debate is not over whether the 
states should enact disabled parking programs, but over who should 
be required to pay for them.  Thus, while all fifty states enforce 
disabled parking programs that seem to comply with Title II’s anti-
discrimination mandate, most states do not comply with another 
provision of the ADA promulgated by the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”).6  28 C.F.R. section 35.130(f)7 (the “Regulation”) prohibits 
states from charging the disabled fees to recover the costs of Title II 
programs.8  State non-compliance with the Regulation has sparked a 
substantial amount of litigation over whether Title II validly prohibits 
the states and state officials from charging disabled individuals to 
participate in Title II programs. 
A recent Supreme Court decision complicates this issue.9  In 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,10 the Court held 
that Title I of the ADA11 could not sustain a suit for damages against 
 
28.10.181 (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-15-308 (Michie 2001); CAL. VEH. CODE 
§ 5007 (West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291-52 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 49-410 (Michie 
2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 31L.2 (West 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.042 (Banks-
Baldwin 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 521 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANSP. II § 13-616 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-19-56 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 
49-4-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1738 (2001); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 404-a 
(McKinney 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 811.602 (2001); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1388 
(West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-28-7 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-5-76.1 (Michie 
2001); 23 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 304(a) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.16.381 
(2001); W. VA. CODE § 17C-13-6 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-213 (Michie 2001). 
 5 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.0848 (West 2001) (charging $15 for four-year 
permits and $22.50 for six-year permits); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 (2001) 
(charging a $25 fee for placards); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-21-103 (2001) (charging a 
$20.50 initial fee and $3 renewal fee every two years which was noted by the Sixth 
Circuit in, Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 614 (2000), as over 1000% of the raw 
cost of disabled placards and license plates). 
 6 42 U.S.C. section 12134 (2002) requires the Attorney General to develop 
regulations designed to implement Title II. 
 7 DOJ Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local 
Governments, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2003) is hereinafter referred to as the 
“Regulation.” 
 8 The states are prohibited from placing, 
a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of 
individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of such measures, such as 
the provision of auxiliary aids or program accessibility, that are 
required to provide that individual or group with the non-
discriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part. 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2001). 
 9 See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 10 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 11 Title I prohibits discrimination against the disabled by employers.  42 U.S.C. § 
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the states as an exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.12  While the Court seemed to limit its holding to 
Title I of the ADA,13 lower courts have extended Garrett’s to Title II.14  
This unsettled state of the law creates a number of ongoing issues, 
including: (1) must the states comply with Title II; (2) does 
compliance include adherence to the prohibition on charging the 
disabled for the costs of Title II programs; (3) if compliance is 
required, can individuals sue for damages or injunctive relief; (4) if 
individuals cannot sue the states to enforce Title II, are the states free 
to ignore the Act; and (5) will the ADA, the most substantial civil 
rights legislation of the 1990’s, survive upcoming judicial scrutiny? 
While the Circuits are split on the issue of whether Title II is 
enforceable as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power, Garrett 
indicates that the Court will likely hold that it is not.15  If Title II is 
unsupported by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unenforceable 
unless supported by another congressional power.16  Part I of this 
 
12112 (a) (2003). 
 12 531 U.S. at 368.  The fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
Congress the power to enact legislation that enforces the other provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See infra note 18. 
 13 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1. 
 14 See Ass’n For Disabled Americans v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. 
Fla. 2001).  Discussing the extension of Garrett to Title II, the Southern District Court 
of Florida stated the following: 
The Court did explicitly limit its holding in Garrett to Title I of the 
ADA, and specifically declined to decide whether Eleventh 
Amendment immunity bars claims against a state under Title II of the 
ADA.  Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.  Despite the Court’s purportedly 
limited ruling, however, the analytical framework set forth in Garrett 
has led several lower courts to conclude that suits by individuals against 
states under Title II are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Id. at 1293 (citing two circuit courts and seven district courts that have extended 
Garrett, finding Title II could not be enforced through private damage actions, and 
one circuit and five district courts that have allowed post-Garrett private damage 
actions seeking Title II enforcement to proceed against the states). 
 15 Id. 
 16 If not within congressional power, any act of Congress is void. 
Early in this Nation’s history, this Court established the sound 
proposition that constitutional government in a system of separated 
powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative act, even 
of Congress itself, that is “repugnant to the Constitution . . . .” 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (finding that Miranda 
announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not legislatively revoke) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 148 (1803)). 
It has been the policy of the American states . . . and of the people of 
the United States . . . to define with precision the objects of the 
legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled 
boundaries.  If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, 
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Comment explores Garrett and its impact on the current circuit split 
within the Title II subset of disabled parking cases. 
Congress invoked two of its powers17 when it enacted Title II: the 
Fourteenth Amendment18 and the Commerce Clause Power.19  
Although the Commerce Clause power does not abrogate state 
immunity,20 if Title II is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause 
power, individuals should be able to prevent states from charging 
them to recover costs of Title II programs through Ex Parte Young21 
suits for injunctive relief.  Ex Parte Young allows an individual to sue a 
state official for injunctive relief22 when that official acts in violation 
of a federal law.23  Under Ex Parte Young a state official acting in 
violation of federal law is acting illegally and cannot claim the state’s 
immunity from suit because a state’s power is insufficient to 
immunize state official activity that violates federal law.24  The illegal 
acts of the state officer strip the officer of state authority making the 
suit one against him personally rather than one against the state.25  Ex 
Parte Young is often referred to as a fiction26 because even though the 
 
violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void. 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 168 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting)). 
 17 While the Constitution gives Congress many powers, not all of these powers 
can be used to support legislation.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 168 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 18 “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 19 “Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.  “It 
is the purpose of this act . . . to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, 
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate 
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by 
people with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002). 
 20 The only congressional power that, if properly utilized by Congress, enables a 
private citizen to sue a state directly for money damages without that state’s consent 
is Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida 
Prepaidpostsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (finding Florida 
could not be sued under the Lanham Act because such suit was unsupported by 
either state consent or valid Fourteenth Amendment waiver of sovereign immunity). 
 21 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 22 An individual cannot recover money damages from a state official through an 
Ex Parte Young suit.  See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (upholding a lower 
court’s order for prospective injunctive relief but reversing the lower court’s award of 
money damages where plaintiff sued under Ex Parte Young theory). 
 23 Id. 
 24 209 U.S. at 160. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Indian Tribe, 521 U.S. 561, 570 (1997) (discussing 
Ex Parte Young as an “obvious fiction”). 
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suit is nominally against the state official, the suit is seeking relief 
from state action and is therefore really a suit against the state.27  If 
the Regulation is a valid federal law because it is within Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power to enact, then the regulation is indirectly 
enforceable against the states. 
Part II considers the validity of Title II under Congress’s 
Commerce Power, an issue that remains unlitigated in the circuit 
courts.28  This Part demonstrates that the Commerce Clause provides 
ample support for the Regulation.  Therefore, individual plaintiffs 
should be able to sue state officials and enforce the Regulation 
through Ex Parte Young actions.  Even if Title II is a valid exercise of 
the Commerce Power, Title II may still be unenforceable if it violates 
the Tenth Amendment.29  The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress 
from forcing the states or state officers to act.30  Part III will explore 
this issue.  This analysis indicates that Congress may not be able to 
force the states to enact disabled parking programs but can regulate 
such programs if they are voluntarily enacted by the states. 
Even if Title II is a valid exercise of Commerce Power and the 
Tenth Amendment does not prevent Congress from regulating state 
disabled parking programs, another inquiry is necessary to determine 
whether the Regulation is enforceable because it was not enacted by 
Congress, but by the DOJ.  Part IV will demonstrate, using the 
current Chevron test for analyzing whether an agency’s exercise of 
congressionally granted power is valid, that the regulation is indeed 
enforceable. 
A further inquiry is necessary to answer the question of where 
plaintiffs can bring enforcement actions because the Tax Injunction 
Act of 193731 (“TIA”) may bar plaintiffs from bringing these actions in 
federal court.  Part V will focus on a second circuit split over whether 
 
 27 Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman 
endorses this view of Ex Parte Young.  465 U.S. 89, 144 n.25 (1984). 
 28 Courts noting but not deciding this issue include the Tenth Circuit in 
Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 (2001); the Second Circuit in Garcia v. 
State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 108 (2001); the Eighth Circuit in 
Randolph v. Rogers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 n.12 (2001); the Seventh Circuit in Walker v. 
Snyder, 215 F.3d 344, 346 (2000) (assuming, without deciding, that the ADA is a valid 
exercise of Commerce Clause power); Bowers v. NCAA, 1717 F. Supp. 2d 389, 407 
(D.N.J. 2001) (assuming without deciding that the ADA is a valid exercise of 
Commerce Clause power). 
 29 The Tenth Amendment explicitly reserves some powers for the states: “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. 
 30 See infra PART III. 
 31 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
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the program fees collected by the states are properly considered taxes 
for the purposes of the TIA.  This inquiry will demonstrate that while 
plaintiffs in a minority of states may be prohibited from bringing 
Regulation enforcement actions in federal court, the majority of 
plaintiffs will be able to bring these suits in both federal and state 
court.  The circuit cases on this issue indicate that fees designed to 
generate revenue for the state beyond the costs of the disabled 
parking programs are taxes, and that fees designed to merely recover 
the costs of these programs are not.32 
Finally, this Comment concludes that all fifty states can be 
prevented from charging disabled drivers to participate in disabled 
parking programs because: (1) Title II of the ADA is a proper 
exercise of Commerce Clause power; (2) the States have voluntarily 
enacted disabled parking programs; (3) the Regulation is valid under 
the Chevron framework; and (4) while the TIA may impact federal 
court jurisdiction in a minority of cases, it will not prevent plaintiffs 
from obtaining relief for violations of the Regulation. 
I.  GARRETT AND THE SPLIT OVER THE VALIDITY AND METHODS OF 
ANALYSIS OF TITLE II AND 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(F) AS AN EXERCISE OF 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER 
A.  Garrett v. Board of Trustees33 
Of the five circuits to consider the Regulation, only the last of 
these decisions was handed down in the wake of Garrett.34  Garrett 
holds that Title I of the ADA is an invalid exercise of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and, therefore, private 
individuals cannot sue the states directly for Title I violations.35  While 
this decision is expressly limited to Title I, the Court may soon extend 
its Garrett holding to Title II, as it has granted certiorari on this issue 
before.36 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 34 See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 35 531 U.S. at 374. 
 36 The Tenth Circuit twice delayed its decision in Thompson v. Colorado to await 
the outcome of two Supreme Court cases. 
After oral argument, this court formally abated the case following the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Florida Dept. of Corr. v. Dickson.  
The Dickson case settled, however, and this case was then reactivated.  
This court further delayed deciding this case, however, in order to 
await the outcome of Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett and 
to allow the parties and the United States as intervenor to file 
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Analyzing whether Title I validly abrogates states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity,37 the Court first identified the Fourteenth 
Amendment right at issue.38  The Court found that the disabled have 
the right to be free from irrational state discrimination and that the 
states can discriminate against the disabled as long as the 
discrimination is rationally linked to a legitimate governmental 
interest.39  Therefore, the right in question is a negative right that 
protects against irrational state discrimination.40 
In Garrett, the Court found that Congress could only enact 
positive law to enforce this Fourteenth Amendment right if it 
identified a pattern of irrational state discrimination against the 
disabled.41  If Congress identified such a pattern in state employment 
practices, then Title I would be a valid exercise of Congress’s 
enforcement power.42  The Court determined in Garrett, however, that 
Congress had not identified repeated irrational state discrimination 
 
supplemental briefs; the Supreme Court decided Garrett on February 
21, 2001. 
Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1023 (citations omitted).  Dickson held that the ADA, as a 
whole, was a valid abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from private 
suits for damages, because the ADA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.  See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 
1429 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 37 The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a 
State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the 
Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.  
The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that 
nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal 
court.  We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the 
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally 
intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional 
authority.  The first of these requirements is not in dispute here.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12202 (“A State shall not be immune under the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in 
[a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of 
this chapter”).  The question, then, is whether Congress acted within 
its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal 
court for money damages under the ADA. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 38 531 U.S. at 365. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 368. 
 42 Id. 
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against the disabled in state employment practices.43  The Court 
noted that the congressional record supporting Title I contains 
numerous examples of discrimination against the disabled in the 
employment context.44  The Court held, however, that the majority of 
these examples do not count as part of a state pattern against the 
disabled that support Title I as an exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power that is binding against the states 
because the examples were not contemporaneous acts of 
discrimination by the “states themselves.”45 
The Court further noted in dicta that even if Congress developed 
a sufficient record of irrational employment discrimination, the 
remedy it developed for this discrimination would still have to be 
congruent and proportional to the pattern identified by Congress.46  
The Court found that the duties imposed on states by Title I went 
beyond what even a clear pattern of state discrimination could 
support.47  A clear pattern of state discrimination, the Court 
suggested, would resemble that identified by Congress in support of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.48  Although the Court determined that 
 
 43 The Court noted the record contained only six examples of such 
discrimination.  Id. at 369.  Justice Breyer vigorously disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of what should count as an example of unconstitutional 
discrimination.  531 U.S. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer, in contrast to 
the majority’s identification of six examples of state discrimination, found the record 
contained over 300 examples of state discrimination.)  The majority’s reply to this 
assertion clarifies its position: 
Only a small fraction of the anecdotes Justice Breyer identifies in his 
Appendix C relate to state discrimination against the disabled in 
employment.  At most, somewhere around 50 of these allegations 
describe conduct that could conceivably amount to constitutional 
violations by the States, and most of them are so general and brief that 
no firm conclusion can be drawn.  The overwhelming majority of these 
accounts pertain to alleged discrimination by the States in the 
provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas 
are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA. 
Id. at 371 n.7. 
 44 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368, 369 n.5. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 372. 
 47 “The accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that 
it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would 
fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon the employer.”  Id. 
 48 In that Act, Congress documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional 
action by the States. State officials, Congress found, routinely applied 
voting tests in order to exclude African-American citizens from 
registering to vote. [citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
312 (1966).]  Congress also determined that litigation had proved 
ineffective and that there persisted an otherwise inexplicable 50-
percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-American 
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disabled individuals do have specific Fourteenth Amendment rights, 
it also held that the identified congressional record of state 
discrimination was insufficient to support an abrogation of state 
immunity, and suggested that even if the record was adequate, the 
remedies developed by Congress were not congruent and 
proportional to the pattern of violations.49 
The Court did not seem to think its holding would dramatically 
impact the enforceability of the ADA.50  Rather, the Court noted in 
dicta that Title I should still be enforceable against the states through 
Ex Parte Young suits for injunctive relief and actions for money 
damages brought by the United States.51  This illustrates that the 
Court assumes that Title I, even if invalid as an exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power, is a valid exercise of another 
congressional power.52 
Although the Court’s ruling in Garrett is limited to Title I, its 
method of analysis suggests that Title II may not be a valid exercise of 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.53  Courts considering 
 
voters in some States. [citing 383 U.S. at 313.] Congress’s response was 
to promulgate in the Voting Rights Act a detailed but limited remedial 
scheme designed to guarantee meaningful enforcement of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in those areas of the Nation where abundant 
evidence of States’ systematic denial of those rights was identified. 
Id. at 373. 
 49 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. 
 50 Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for 
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for 
injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  In 
addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in 
employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of 
redress. 
Id. at 374 n.9. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Congress invoked its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and 
Commerce Clause power when it enacted the ADA.  42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002).  
For the ADA to be valid and enforceable, it must be a legitimate exercise of one or 
both of these powers. 
 53 See supra note 14 for a discussion of courts choosing whether or not to extend 
Garrett’s rationale and invalidate Title II of the ADA as an exercise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power. 
Like its decision in Kimel regarding the regulation of age 
discrimination under the ADEA, the Court in Garrett concluded that 
the ADA presented a broad restriction on disability discrimination, 
such that the ADA prohibited substantially more employment decisions 
by states than would be held unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Redefining the Relationship Between the State and the Federal 
Government: A Focus on the Supreme Court’s Expansion of the Principle of State Sovereign 
Immunity, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 25 (2001). 
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Title II after Garrett have found that Garrett requires them to consider 
whether Title II as a whole is a valid exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.54  Under the Garrett framework, 
rights provided to individuals by any Title of the ADA against the 
states may be unenforceable through private suits for damages if the 
states have not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit.55 
Garrett does not eliminate the possibility, however unlikely, that 
the Court may uphold Title II as a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power.56  The Court, in order 
to reach this result, would have to find that Title II’s congressional 
record indicates that states actively excluded the disabled from 
participating in society.  To support this finding, the record must 
demonstrate that Title II is congruent and proportional to the 
identified pattern of violations that may be contained in an extensive 
history of litigation against the states.  While Garrett offers some 
clarity, the differing approaches to analyzing the validity of the 
Regulation among the circuits demonstrate that current analysis of 
these concerns is still unclear. 
B.  The Circuit Split 
Four circuits are split57 over the question of whether states may 
charge disabled drivers to recover the administrative costs of their 
 
 54 The Sixth Circuit, for example, followed this approach in Popovich v. Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 812 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002). 
[T]he majority of the Supreme Court in Garrett seems to have . . . 
established a clear rule that disability discrimination deserves only 
rational basis review and that Congress may not go beyond this 
standard under the Equal Protection Clause by imposing new liabilities 
on the states.  This Garrett rule would appear to apply to both Title I 
and Title II, although the Court has not made this holding explicit as 
to Title II, and it is possible, though unlikely, that a majority of the 
Supreme Court might distinguish Garrett . . . . 
Id.  The Second Circuit has also followed this whole title approach.  See Garcia v. 
State Univ. of N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 55 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. 
 56 This issue will likely be definitively decided very soon.  The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari on a Title II case from the Ninth Circuit and indicated that it will 
decide whether Title II can be enforced directly against the states for money 
damages.  Hason v. Med. Bd. of California, 294 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002) (No. 02-479). 
 57 See Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Hedgepeth 
v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000); Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 
2000); Brown v. North Carolina DMV, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Dare v. 
California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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disabled parking programs.58  The Regulation prohibits the states 
from placing: 
a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any 
group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of such 
measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program 
accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group 
with the non-discriminatory treatment required by the Act or this 
part.59 
States charge these fees for parking placards and/or special license 
plates, which are required to park in disabled-designated parking 
areas.60  The divided circuits approach the issue in three different 
ways. 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to hold that a private suit 
seeking money damages against a state is a valid method to enforce 
the Regulation.61  The court held that because Title II is a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power 
when considered as a whole, the Regulation is also valid and directly 
enforceable against the states.62  The Fourth Circuit found that the 
Regulation, considered alone, exceeds congressional Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.63  The Fifth Circuit followed the 
Fourth Circuit in dismissing litigation against the state of Texas.64  
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
Title II should be considered as a whole.65  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, 
however, the Tenth Circuit found Title II of the ADA invalid as an 
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.66 
Thus, the circuits are split over whether the Regulation is a valid 
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power if Title II as 
a whole is a valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power, and whether the Regulation must be an independently valid 
exercise of congressional power to provide a right that is directly 
enforceable against the states.  A review of the rationales employed by 
these circuits illustrates the approaches and provides the groundwork 
for a more thorough discussion of these issues. 
 
 58 See infra PART I.B. 
 59 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2001). 
 60 See supra note 4. 
 61 Dare, 191 F.3d at 1167. 
 62 Id. at 1175. 
 63 Brown, 166 F.3d at 698. 
 64 Neinast, 217 F.3d at 275. 
 65 Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1020. 
 66 Id. at 1031. 
 822 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:811 
1.  Dare v. California67 
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit held that Title II’s prohibition on 
charging the disabled to participate in ADA programs could be 
enforced through private suits for damages because Title II of the 
ADA was a valid exercise of congressional power that properly 
abrogated state immunity.68  The Court found that even though the 
DOJ—acting under congressionally delegated authority—enacted the 
Regulation, it must be treated as though Congress enacted it, because 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Olmstead v. ex rel Zimring69 requires 
courts to treat federal agencies as they would Congress.70  Under this 
rationale, Title II regulations promulgated by the DOJ are directly 
enforceable against the states because Congress enacted the 
regulations through its delegated agent, the DOJ.71  As long as the 
DOJ’s regulations are generally consistent with the purposes of the 
ADA, courts need not consider whether a regulation is valid.72  As 
long as the Title that a regulation is enacted under is valid, the 
regulation will also be valid.73 
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis, because it did not have the benefit 
of the Supreme Court’s Garrett holding, focused on the “congruence 
and proportionality” requirements articulated in City of Boerne v. 
Flores.74  Under this test, Congress properly abrogates state immunity 
when it enacts legislation that uses means congruent to the scope of a 
well-identified pattern of unconstitutional activity.75  The legislation 
must also be proportional in that it cannot do much more than is 
necessary to prevent the identified unconstitutional behavior from 
 
 67 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 68 Id. at 1175. 
 69 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 70 Courts must sometimes defer to the determinations of federal agencies the 
same way courts would defer to Congress. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Olmstead: [b]ecause the Department 
[of Justice] is the agency directed by Congress to issue regulations 
implementing Title II, its views warrant respect.  We need not inquire 
whether the degree of deference described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., is in order; “it is enough to 
observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a 
statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” 
191 F.3d at 1176 n.7 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Dare, 191 F.3d at 1174 (discussing the congruence and proportionality 
requirements set forth in Boerne). 
 75 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
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occurring in the future.76 
The Ninth Circuit found that Title II satisfies Boerne’s 
congruence requirement because Congress made “specific factual 
findings of arbitrary and invidious discrimination against the 
disabled” and enacted the ADA in response to those findings.77  The 
court found that Congress’s Title II factual findings and remedies 
should be given deference.78  The Ninth Circuit further noted that 
the Supreme Court previously found that “unjustified isolation . . . is 
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.”79  The court 
determined Title II also satisfies Boerne’s proportionality requirement 
because “Congress’s findings were sufficiently extensive and related 
to the ADA’s provisions that [Title II] can be understood as 
responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior.”80  In 
sum, Dare prohibits all states within the Ninth Circuit from charging 
disabled drivers for participating in disabled parking programs.81 
2.  Brown v. North Carolina DMV82 
The Fourth Circuit also utilized a Boerne “congruence and 
proportionality” analysis to address the validity of the Regulation.83  
The circuit, considering the regulation alone, found the Regulation 
an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.84  
Consequently, the court found that the Regulation does not provide 
private individuals with Fourteenth Amendment actions against the 
states.85  The United States, as an intervenor, encouraged the court to 
consider the constitutionality of Title II as a whole, rather than the 
Regulation standing alone.86  The court refused the government’s 
proposed analysis, finding such a consideration would force the court 
to “ratify unnecessarily the constitutionality of every provision in the 
title.”87  To support its position, the court noted that courts have long 
sought to adjudge only unavoidable questions of constitutionality.88  
 
 76 Id. at 532. 
 77 Dare, 191 F.3d at 1174. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1175 (quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 595). 
 80 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 81 See supra note 4. 
 82 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 83 Id. at 705. 
 84 Id. at 707-08. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 703. 
 87 Id. 
 88 “If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
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The Fourth Circuit also determined that the broad method of 
analysis would allow unconstitutional regulations to hide behind 
constitutional statutes.89  The court postulated that this would allow 
unconstitutional regulations to be enforced against the states, a 
problem of particular importance in light of federalism and 
sovereign immunity concerns.90 
The Fourth Circuit’s Boerne analysis included a discussion of the 
legislative record of the ADA that concluded the type of activity 
identified by Congress, while surely discriminatory, did not constitute 
unconstitutional discrimination by the states.91  More importantly, the 
court found that the Regulation’s prohibition on charging disabled 
drivers could only be sustained if “many of those surcharges ‘have a 
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.’”92  The court looked 
to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center93 as the benchmark for 
disabled individuals Fourteenth Amendment rights, and applied 
rational basis scrutiny to the fees.94  In so doing, the court quickly 
determined the fees were rationally based to recover the cost of 
programs designed to help the disabled,95 and because the fees were 
rational, the disabled did not have a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
be protected from them.96  The court emphasized that, in its view, the 
Regulation went well beyond prophylactic action and instead 
attempted to do something that Cleburne prohibits: establish the 
 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”  Brown, 166 F.3d at 704 
(quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104 (1944)). 
 89 The court seemed particularly concerned that this approach would upset the 
balance of federalism in favor of the national government. 
Looking broadly at an entire title would leave underprotected these 
important state interests in immunity.  Ratifying an entire title and 
finding abrogation without examining the actual, specific legal basis 
for suit could subject a state to suit in federal court pursuant to an 
unconstitutional provision buried in the midst of an otherwise 
constitutional statutory scheme.  Such a jurisprudence—one leading to 
sweeping validations of abrogation—would be completely discordant 
with the doctrine of dual sovereignty. 
Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 707. 
 92 Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 
 93 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that classifications of individuals with mental 
retardation are quasi-suspect and subject to rational review). 
 94 A state violates the Equal Protection rights of the disabled when its actions 
towards the disabled are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  
See supra PART I.A. 
 95 Brown, 166 F.3d at 707. 
 96 Id. 
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disabled as a “suspect or quasi-suspect equal protection 
classification.”97 
The close of the court’s opinion, emphasizing the amount of the 
yearly one dollar per driver fee, illustrates the court’s satisfaction that 
the fee was related to a legitimate governmental purpose and 
therefore survived rational basis review.98  Affirming the plaintiff’s 
lack of standing to sue, the Fourth Circuit expressly noted that its 
opinion in no way adjudged the Regulation’s constitutionality as an 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.99 
3.  Neinast v. Texas100 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis is similar to that of the Fourth 
Circuit.  Moreover, its conclusion is the same—the Regulation is not a 
valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.101  Like 
the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth considered Boerne of central import.102  
Unlike the Fourth, however, the Fifth Circuit combined Boerne with a 
Chevron103 analysis to determine the degree of deference, if any, it had 
to give the DOJ.104 
The court found, even under Chevron,105 that it was not required 
to give the DOJ any deference regarding the Regulation because the 
Regulation went beyond Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power106 by attempting to create rights to protect against 
constitutional, rather than unconstitutional, discrimination.107  The 
court implied that although Title II’s access requirements might be 
constitutionally permissible, anything beyond requiring the states to 
provide access, such as a prohibition on rational discrimination 
against the disabled, was beyond Congress’s power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.108 
 
 97 Id. at 707-08. 
 98 “To cover the cost of the placards, North Carolina introduced the most modest 
of all possible fees—one dollar a year.”  Id. at 708. 
 99 Id. at 708 n.1. 
 100 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 282. 
 103 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  For a discussion of Chevron, see infra PART IV. 
 104 Neinast, 217 F.3d at 281. 
 105 See infra PART IV for a discussion of Chevron. 
 106 “An agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate 
rules, cannot have greater power to regulate state conduct than does Congress.”  
Neinast, 217 F.3d at 281. 
 107 Id. at 282. 
 108 The regulation’s scope goes further than simply requiring states to 
provide access to their facilities and programs; it bars the sharing of any 
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4.  Thompson v. Colorado109 
Thompson, a Tenth Circuit decision issued in 2001, illustrates the 
potential impact of Garrett.110  The plaintiffs in Thompson, disabled 
drivers suing the state to prevent it from charging fees to participate 
in the state’s disabled parking program, were in an identical position 
to those in earlier cases.111  Although the court’s method of analysis 
resembles that of the Dare court, the Thompson court held, the 
opposite of Dare, that Title II exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power to enact.112 
Both parties in Dare moved for summary judgment at the district 
court level.113  The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied Colorado’s motion, holding that Title 
II was a valid abrogation of state immunity.114  The Tenth Circuit, 
attempting to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment barred 
the plaintiff’s suit, focused its review on whether Title II was, in fact, a 
valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power.115 
The Tenth Circuit’s holding is broad: none of Title II validly 
abrogates states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress 
did not identify a historical pattern of unconstitutional state 
 
costs of such measures, a highly intrusive limit on the core state power 
to choose revenue sources.  There is no plausible claim that banning 
any fees by the state corrects past discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities regarding access or that it seeks prophylactically to 
prevent the state from intentionally discouraging them from enjoying 
access.  A requirement as to who bears minimal costs of 
accommodation relates back not to the relevant constitutional harm, 
but only to other prophylactic steps.  We thus distinguish this situation 
from Congress’ss ban through the Voting Rights Act on literacy tests, 
whose use had been shown to be an effort to discriminate. (citing 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-26.; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 
(1996)).  This degree of separation leaves the regulation unanchored 
to a constitutional purpose.  It is an impermissible form of regulatory 
creep.  The regulation bears such an attenuated relationship to the 
remedial goal that it cannot be understood as a remedial or 
prophylactic response to unconstitutional behavior.  We hold that 28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(f) exceeds the scope of Congress’s power to abrogate 
the states’ immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 109 278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1022. 
 112 Id. at 1034. 
 113 Id. at 1022. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1028-29. 
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discrimination against the disabled involving state “services, 
programs, and activities” when it enacted the ADA.116  The court’s 
rationale rested on its interpretation of the Garrett decision, 
beginning with the premise that each title of the ADA should be 
considered independently to determine if it is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.117  The 
Tenth Circuit found that, because of the doctrinal refinement in 
Garrett, it faced an issue of first impression as to the validity of Title 
II.118 
The court’s second step followed Garrett by attempting to 
“identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at 
issue.”119  The court found that the accommodation requirements of 
Title II went beyond the general requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause.120  Instead, the court noted that the states are 
subject to three general Fourteenth Amendment principles 
governing the rights of the disabled.121  First, facial distinctions 
between the non-disabled and the disabled must be rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.122  Second, invidious state action against 
the disabled is always unconstitutional.123  Finally, in “certain limited 
circumstances such as those involving voting rights and prison 
conditions, states are required to make at least some 
accommodations for the disabled.”124  Using these principles, the 
court determined that Congress improperly invoked the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it enacted Title II of the ADA because the 
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to create affirmative 
obligations on the states that are intended to benefit disabled 
individuals.125 
 
 116 Id. at 1034. 
 117 Id. at 1027. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 1030 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365). 
 120 The court goes further than this, suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause 
may not support any of the ADA. 
While the basic premise of the Equal Protection Clause is that similarly 
situated citizens should be treated alike, the mandate of the ADA is 
that those who are not similarly situated should be treated differently.  
The Equal Protection Clause does not generally require 
accommodations on behalf of the disabled by the states. 
Id. at 1031. 
 121 Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1032. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1031. 
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The Tenth Circuit provided an additional rationale for finding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide Congress with the 
power to enact the ADA.126  Here the court again turned to Garrett, 
considering whether or not Congress sufficiently established a 
legislative record of state violation of the rights of the disabled.127  
While the court noted that the vast majority of the legislative record 
supporting Title II involved the public entities refusing to ensure that 
disabled individuals had access to “programs, services and activities,” 
it found that these examples predominantly involved “local officials 
and not the states.”128  The court suggested that the preponderance of 
positive state legislation for the disabled effectively prevents Congress 
from establishing a sufficient record to justify Title II by largely 
eliminating state discrimination against the disabled.129 
C.  Future Analysis of Title II: What Courts Should do When 
Considering Title II as an Exercise of Fourteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Power 
All fifty states have passed legislation protecting disabled 
citizens.130  A number of these state laws do not protect the disabled as 
comprehensively as the ADA.131  Indeed, the circuit split over disabled 
parking placard fees offers a clear example of state legislation that 
does not reach as far as the ADA in protecting the rights of the 
disabled.132  Yet, state laws may provide minimal protection that is 
 
 126 Id. at 1034. 
 127 Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1034. 
 128 Id. at 1033. 
 129 Id. at 1033 n.8. 
 130 In Garrett, the majority noted that state action may have effectively limited the 
need for federal intervention. 
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 
1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures.  At least 
one Member of Congress remarked that “this is probably one of the 
few times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal 
Government, it’s not funny.”  Hearing on Discrimination Against 
Cancer Victims and the Handicapped before the Subcommittee on 
Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education 
and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1987).  A number of these 
provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring 
accommodation. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5.  With respect to employment laws, the Court is certainly 
correct.  All fifty states have passed disabled employment legislation.  See Stevens v. 
Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 740 n.6 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 131 If all states enacted schemes as comprehensive as the ADA, the thirty-one states 
that charge for disabled parking placards would be barred from enacting the fee 
schemes discussed in this Comment by their own laws. 
 132 See supra PART I.B. 
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sufficient to keep Congress from ever developing the kind of record 
that would be adequate to support the affirmative obligations of the 
Regulation and Title II.  While this is discouraging for ADA plaintiffs 
seeking money damages, the Supreme Court has not determined that 
the record of Title II is deficient, it has only indicated that the record 
of Title I was insufficient for a valid exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power and that the record of the Voting 
Rights Act was sufficient.133  Courts considering Title II’s validity will 
therefore have to consider whether the congressional record 
supporting Title II is adequate to meet the concerns the Court 
outlined in Garrett.134  This will require courts to consider whether 
Title II’s record is like Title I’s, and therefore deficient, or enough 
like the Voting Rights Act’s to be a valid exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment power. 
II.  TITLE II IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S COMMERCE CLAUSE 
POWER 
Plaintiffs may lose their ability to sue the states directly for 
money damages for violating the Regulation if the Court finds Title II 
is an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.  
Nonetheless, if Title II is a valid exercise of constitutional authority—
other than that stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment—then 
plaintiffs should still be able to obtain injunctive relief and attorney’s 
fees135 by suing state officials under Ex Parte Young.136  To support the 
ADA Congress invoked not only its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, but also its Commerce Clause power.137 
No court has yet determined whether the Commerce Clause 
provides an adequate source of power to support the Regulation.  
The attractiveness of the ADA’s direct suit provision and its 
 
 133 See supra note 48. 
 134 See supra PART I.B. 
 135 Like other civil rights statutes, the ADA provides that successful ADA plaintiffs 
are entitled to attorney’s fees.  42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2002). 
 136 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ 
sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages 
under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no 
federal recourse against discrimination.  Title I of the ADA still 
prescribes standards applicable to the States.  Those standards can be 
enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as 
by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte 
Young. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
 137 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(4) (2002). 
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corresponding damages remedy is likely a factor that deters plaintiffs 
from suing under Ex Parte Young.138  Decisions invalidating the 
Regulation as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power seem to have surprised many plaintiffs.139  It is likely that 
plaintiffs litigating the parking issue would have included Ex Parte 
Young claims had they foreseen these holdings.140  Some courts have 
resisted determining the ADA’s constitutionality under the 
Commerce Clause because they found the ADA, as a whole, was a 
valid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.141  
Given the number of circuits finding the Regulation and/or Title II 
unconstitutional as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, it is probable that future Title II litigation 
brought against state officials will focus on the Title’s validity under 
the Commerce Clause.  Thus, a review of the Commerce Clause is in 
order. 
A.  What Congress can Regulate under the Commerce Power: United 
States v. Lopez142 & United States v. Morrison143 
For most of the twentieth century, the Commerce Clause served 
as a congressional catchall, affording Congress nearly limitless power 
to enact new laws.144  This interpretation of the Commerce Clause was 
 
 138 If [a] federal statute proves to be beyond Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment—a prospect Flores makes more than 
speculative—then the remedies available in the federal forum shrink 
before the Eleventh Amendment bar.  Monetary damages are 
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment and prospective injunctive 
relief against state officials, as permitted by Ex parte Young, is all that 
remains. 
Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 803 (1998). 
 139 The plaintiffs in Thompson attempted to add an Ex Parte Young claim at the 
circuit level, anticipating the Court’s decision after Garrett.  The circuit court, 
however, denied the plaintiff’s request.  Thompson, 278 F.3d at 1025 n.2. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Brown, 166 F.3d at 708 n.1.  “We need not decide whether Congress 
properly invoked its Commerce Clause power in enacting the ADA, for we have 
already held that the ADA is a valid exercise of congressional power under section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835-
36 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Amos v. Maryland Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 
F.3d 212, 223 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 142 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 143 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 144 Lopez is recognized as a severe step in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine.  
“In United States v. Lopez, the Court held for the first time in recent years that the 
commerce power is not absolutely plenary and that some things are beyond 
Congress’s reach under the commerce power.”  Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, 
Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 3, 12 (1997). 
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dramatically altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez.145  To 
determine if the Regulation and/or Title II may survive as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Power, three pivotal cases—Lopez, 
Morrison, and Condon—must be analyzed in turn. 
1.  Lopez: the Commerce Framework Redefined 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun Free School 
Zone Act146 (“GFSZA”) was not a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Power.147  The Court, reviewing Commerce Clause 
doctrine, found that the doctrine allows Congress to regulate: 
channels of commerce; persons, things, and instrumentalities in 
interstate commerce; and intrastate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.148  Lopez embodies the Court’s restatement of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, after a long 
period during which the Clause was treated as a plenary power 
subject only to internal constitutional limitations.149 
The Court found that the possession of a gun in a school zone 
was neither a commercial activity nor one that was “connected in any 
way to interstate commerce.”150  The Court linked each of the three 
acceptable categories of commerce regulation to precedent to 
support its interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Power.151  The 
Court then developed the proposition that Congress had the power 
to regulate channels of interstate commerce152 from United States v. 
Darby153 and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.154  The Court further 
noted that Congress might regulate “instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”155  To support 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (2002).  The act made it a crime “for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable 
cause to believe, is a school zone.”  18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (2002). 
 147 Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 
 148 Id. at 558-59. 
 149 See supra note 144. 
 150 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 151 Id. at 558-59. 
 152 While the channel of commerce argument might conceivably be made by 
future litigants, it does not pertain to the type of activity regulated by 28 C.F.R. 
section 35.130(f), and consequently does not merit much discussion here. 
 153 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Act of 1938 as an exercise of 
the Commerce Power). 
 154 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a 
valid exercise of the Commerce Power). 
 155 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
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this proposition, the Court cited the Shreveport Rate Cases,156 Southern 
Railroad Co. v. United States,157 and Perez v. United States.158  Thus, 
Congress may regulate interstate rail lines and the fees that they 
charge,159 invoke safety regulations that create standards applicable to 
intrastate traffic in order to maintain interstate safety,160 and regulate 
activities like loan sharking that have a substantial affect on interstate 
crime and, therefore, interstate commerce as a whole.161 
The final category the Court identified includes “those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”162  This type of activity 
is identified in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel163 and in Maryland v. 
Wirtz.164  This category permits Congress to regulate national labor 
practices,165 as well as the minimum wage and maximum hours of 
employees engaged in commerce related activities.166  Notably, the 
Wirtz Court found that: 
while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of 
commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a 
State is involved.  If a State is engaging in economic activities that 
are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in 
by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal regulation.167 
In Lopez, the Court also quoted from Wickard v. Filburn,168 a case 
holding Congress has the power to regulate the production of home-
grown wheat: 
[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect 
 
 156 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (holding that the Commerce Power allows Congress 
to regulate the “intrastate transactions of interstate carriers”). 
 157 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (noting that Congress has the power to regulate the 
interstate shipment of goods). 
 158 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding Congress’s regulation of loansharking, an 
intrastate activity, because of loansharking’s interstate effects). 
 159 Shreveport, 234 U.S. at 360. 
 160 Southern, 220 U.S. at 26. 
 161 Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57. 
 162 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 163 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act as a proper 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
 164 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (finding the Commerce Power supported Congress’s 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
 165 Jones, 301 U.S. at 37. 
 166 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27. 
 167 Id. at 196. 
 168 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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is what might at some earlier time have been defined as “direct” 
or “indirect.”169 
The Court applied the three-tiered framework to the GFSZA and 
determined that the Act fit into neither of the first two categories.170  
The Court then began its analysis of whether the GFZSA fit into the 
third category by restating that “where economic activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained.”171  The Court, considering whether the Act regulated 
activity that had a substantial affect on interstate commerce, 
determined that it did not.172  The Court noted the Act did not 
regulate activity that was substantially related to interstate commerce, 
and did not contain a jurisdictional analysis to determine whether the 
gun possession in question in a particular case actually affected 
interstate commerce.173  Although Congress was not required to 
present congressional findings of an activity’s substantial effects on 
interstate commerce in the record of any act invoked under the 
Commerce Clause, the Court remarked that such “findings would 
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in 
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no 
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.”174 
B.  Morrison: Further Constriction of the Commerce Power 
In Morrison, the Court invalidated another act enacted under 
Congress’s Commerce Power, the Violence Against Women Act175 
(“VAWA”).176  VAWA is similar to the ADA, in that Congress utilized 
both its Commerce Power and its Enforcement Power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.177  The Court’s analysis of the Commerce 
Clause support for VAWA followed in the footsteps of Lopez.178 
The Court concluded that violent, gender-based crime was a 
non-economic activity and that Congress could not regulate it under 
 
 169 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125). 
 170 Id. at 559. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 561. 
 174 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
 175 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002). 
 176 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 177 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2002). 
 178 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.  “Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law 
demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of 
intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, 
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”  Id. at 611. 
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the Commerce Power, despite the economic effects of the crime.179  
Even though VAWA was supported by specific legislative findings as 
to the economic effects of the activity it regulated, like the GFSZA, 
the Court found that VAWA contained “no jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.”180  The Court 
determined it could independently analyze evidence presented in the 
congressional record to determine whether the evidence supported 
the proposition that the activity substantially affected commerce181 
and rejected the evidence presented by Congress to support VAWA.182  
Thus, while VAWA was supported by congressional findings that 
gender-motivated violence had a substantial interstate impact, the 
Court found these examples were precisely the kind of congressional 
justification that the Court rejected in Lopez.183  The Court held that 
this rationale, which would allow Congress to regulate any crime with 
a substantial but attenuated nationwide effect on commerce, went 
well beyond the scope of permissible regulation under Congress’s 
Commerce Power.184 
C.  Applying the Commerce Clause Framework to Title II 
At this point, it is worth inquiring how Title II is different from 
the legislation struck down by the Court in Lopez and Morrison.  This 
inquiry addresses whether Title II properly regulates activity that falls 
within any of the Lopez categories.185 
While Title II does not seem to fit within either the first or 
 
 179 Id. at 613. 
 180 Id. at 613-14. 
 181 Id. at 614. 
 182 Id. at 616-17. 
 183 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-17. 
 184 “We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce.  The Constitution requires a distinction between what 
is truly national and what is truly local.”  Id. at 617-18. 
 185 Notably, two circuits adopted the principle that the Regulation must be valid if 
Title II is valid, see Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000); Brown v. North 
Carolina DMV, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), while another two circuits have held 
that the Regulation may be invalid even if Title II is valid, see Thompson v. Colorado, 
278 F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999). 
This analysis may not be relevant for Commerce Clause analysis.  The 
Regulation, standing alone, may regulate commerce in an acceptable way even if 
Title II as a whole does not.  Indeed, if courts find that the Regulation is a valid 
exercise of Commerce Clause power they do not have to consider Title II as a whole, 
because to regulate under the Commerce Clause, Congress need not identify how 
the “thing” it is regulating affects interstate commerce. 
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second Lopez category, it does fit within the third.  Title II’s regulation 
of programs, activities, and services does not clearly regulate the 
channels of interstate commerce.  Also, it does not seem to regulate 
typically economic activity, rather, it regulates an activity with a 
substantial impact interstate commerce.  Therefore, Title II must be 
considered under the third prong of the Lopez framework.  The 
rationale tying Title II to the Commerce Clause is that the disabled 
are capable of being economically productive members of American 
society, but have historically been prevented from engaging in 
productive commercial activity by widespread discrimination.186  In 
Bowers v. NAACP, considering whether Title II regulated commercial 
activity, noted that Congress clearly thought it did: 
Congress plainly considered the ADA generally, and Title II in 
particular, to be a very significant piece of commercial legislation . 
. . The legislative history evinces a continuing focus on the 
economic impact of the public accommodations aspects of the bill. 
Congress noted, for instance, that lack of accommodations creates 
unemployment and underemployment . . . reduces consumer 
spending . . . and undermines public health efforts to contain the 
spread of disease . . . all of which contribute to lower tax revenues 
and higher government spending, amounting to billions of dollars 
annually.187 
The activity regulated by Title II is not activity like that regulated 
in the GFSZA or VAWA, but is regulation of state activity that has a 
substantial affect on interstate commerce.  Congress has the authority 
to decide that forcing the disabled to bear the costs of programs 
designed to benefit the disabled counteracts the positive effects of 
such state programs.  Congress, through the DOJ, decided that the 
access barriers presented by fees for special placards and license 
plates are detrimental to commerce and has instructed the states, as 
actors in interstate commerce, that they may not charge the disabled 
such fees.188  Therefore, a court considering this issue should find, 
considering the four Lopez factors,189 that Title II is a valid exercise of 
 
 186 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002). 
 187 Bowers, 171 F. Supp. 2d 406-07. 
 188 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2003). 
 189 Because Title II falls within the third category and attempts to regulate 
intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, a court considering 
whether it is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power must consider the following 
Lopez factors: (1) does the regulated activity substantially affect interstate commerce; 
(2) does the statute contain a jurisdictional element that suggests the statute is 
actually attempting to regulate interstate, rather than intrastate commerce; (3) does 
the Congressional record support the proposition that the regulated activity has a 
substantial relationship to interstate commerce; and (4) would upholding the 
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Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
III.  VOLUNTARILY ENACTED STATE DISABLED PARKING PROGRAMS MAY 
BE REGULATED BY CONGRESS 
Although Congress can regulate activity properly considered 
commerce, the ways Congress can regulate the states as commercial 
actors are limited by the Tenth Amendment.  Thus, even if a court 
finds Title II properly regulates commerce, it will still have to 
consider whether the method of regulation impermissibly violates the 
Tenth Amendment.  Two cases are widely recognized as clearly 
establishing Tenth Amendment limitations on Congress’s ability to 
regulate commerce: New York v. United States190 and Printz v. United 
States.191  In these two cases, the Court established the proposition that 
the federal government may not force “the states to enact or enforce 
a federal regulatory program”192 under the Commerce Clause.  In the 
aftermath of New York and Printz, the states can be required to enact 
new legislation or alter existing legislation in order to conform to 
federal law, so long as the law regulates state activities and does not 
seek “to control or influence the manner in which States regulate 
private parties.”193 
In Reno v. Condon,194 the Court applied these principles to the 
Driver Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (“DPPA”).195  The DPPA 
prohibits states from selling the information they require drivers to 
provide in order to obtain a driver’s license.196  Because the Court 
found that the regulated databases were “things” in interstate 
commerce, it held that the databases could be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause.197  Relying heavily on the principles it articulated 
in South Carolina v. Baker,198 the Court held that the DPPA did not 
 
regulation require the Court to “pile inference upon inference?”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
567.  None of these factors is determinative.  Id. 
 190 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress can use the Commerce Clause 
power to encourage states to act, but not to force the states to act). 
 191 521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997) (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or 
enforce a federal regulatory program. . . .  Congress cannot circumvent that 
prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”). 
 192 Condon, 528 U.S. at 149. 
 193 Id. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)). 
 194 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 195 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2002). 
 196 The states can still distribute the information if they obtain the driver’s 
consent.  Condon, 528 U.S. at 144. 
 197 Id. at 148. 
 198 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (“That a State wishing to engage in certain activity 
must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal 
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require the states to enact new legislation nor assist with federal 
enforcement.199  In so holding, the Court reasoned the DPPA was 
similar to the statute in Baker, because it did not require the states to 
regulate their own citizens, rather it regulated the way in which the 
states conducted their own activities.200  Although the DPPA prohibits 
the sale of the information that states collect from drivers, requires 
the legislature to alter existing statutes, and requires state officials to 
learn the mandate of the DPPA in order to comply with it,201 the 
Court stated that none of these factors were sufficient to support the 
proposition that the DPPA unconstitutionally “commandeered” the 
states.202 
While this analysis suggests that states could escape the 
requirements of the Regulation by revoking their disabled parking 
programs, the states are unlikely to take such action.  Disabled 
parking programs are established programs in every state.  Because 
the Regulation is likely to be upheld as valid under Congress’s 
Commerce Power, it should provide disabled plaintiffs with an 
enforceable right to participate in disabled parking programs without 
paying a fee beyond ordinary licensing costs.  Although the 
Commerce Power could not be used to force states to enact and pay 
for disabled parking programs because this would violate the anti-
commandeering principles outlined above, once states enact such 
programs203  Congress can regulate them. 
IV.  THE REGULATION IS A PERMISSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF TITLE II 
OF THE ADA 
Even if a court walks through the steps discussed above and finds 
that Title II is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power that does 
 
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional 
defect.”). 
 199 Condon, 528 U.S. at 150. 
 200 Regulation of the states is more likely to be upheld when it does not pertain to 
uniquely state activity. 
The DPPA regulates the States as the owners of databases.  It does not 
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, 
and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of 
federal statutes regulating private individuals.  We accordingly 
conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles 
enunciated in New York and Printz. 
Id. at 151. 
 201 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2002). 
 202 Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. 
 203 Many states passed such programs, even prior to the passage of the ADA.  See 
supra note 5. 
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not commandeer the states it will not uphold the Regulation unless it 
finds that the Regulation is based on a permissible interpretation of 
Title II.204  The Regulation was not enacted by Congress, but by the 
DOJ, and is therefore subject to this further review.  This review, 
however, is limited to two factors.205  A court considering a regulation 
must first ask if Congress specifically approved or disapproved of a 
regulation.  If Congress’s intent is clear it is determinative.206  If 
Congress’s intent is not clear but Congress delegated rulemaking 
authority to a federal agency, then the agency’s regulation must be 
upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”207 
The Supreme Court has indicated that this deference to agency 
rulemaking is necessary because “the resolution of ambiguity in a 
statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law.”208  
Although court review of agency policymaking is limited209 courts are 
able to invalidate actions clearly outside of the scope of the statute.210  
This might seem to severely hamper court review of agency action, 
however, courts still have the power, as the above discussion of 
Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause power indicate, to 
invalidate the statute upon which the delegation of authority is based 
and thereby negate the agency’s rulemaking ability under the statute.  
Thus, this type of deference to agency rulemaking, commonly known 
as “Chevron deference” will have no impact if the statute that 
empowers an agency to create the regulation in question is 
invalidated by the courts.211 
Although Congress clearly delegated authority to the DOJ to 
enact regulations designed to implement Title II,212 it does not seem 
that Congress clearly contemplated a definitive approach to the 
 
 204 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 205 Id. at 842-43. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 843.  “Chevron establishes that a reviewing court must often accept any 
reasonable agency construction, even if the court does not regard that construction 
as the best one.”  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 398 (4th ed. 1996). 
 208 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991). 
 209 Id. 
 210 467 U.S. at 843. 
 211 See John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the 
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995), for a more thorough discussion of 
Chevron and Chevron deference. 
 212 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (a) (2003) (“Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this Act [enacted July 26, 1990], the Attorney General shall promulgate 
regulations in an accessible format that implement this subtitle.”). 
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regulation of disabled parking programs when it enacted Title II.  
This will require any court considering the Regulation to take the 
second Chevron step.  This step is not fatal because the regulation of 
disabled parking programs clearly falls within Title II’s general 
coverage of state services, activities, and programs.  Therefore, courts 
must uphold the regulation if they find that Title II is a valid exercise 
of congressional power. 
V.  THE REGULATION IS VALID UNDER THE COMMERCE POWER AND 
CAN BE INDIRECTLY ENFORCED AGAINST THE STATES, BUT NOT 
NECESSARILY IN FEDERAL COURTS 
While the Regulation is likely to be upheld under the Commerce 
Clause, it may not be enforceable in suits brought in federal courts 
because of the TIA.213  In its entirety, the TIA provides that “[t]he 
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, 
levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”214  As the 
Tenth Circuit has noted, the TIA “does not operate to confer 
jurisdiction but instead limits jurisdiction where jurisdiction might 
otherwise exist.”215  Whenever the collection of a state tax can be 
challenged in a state forum, plaintiffs challenging the tax will be 
barred from federal court by the TIA.  Therefore, if the fees collected 
by the states for disabled parking programs are properly considered a 
tax, as at least one circuit finds,216 then plaintiffs may be barred from 
commencing actions in federal court217 unless they have no adequate 
remedy at the state level.  Remedies requiring plaintiffs to pay the tax 
and then seek a refund are adequate to bar a plaintiff from federal 
court.218  A plaintiff’s ability to bring a federal claim in state court will 
also be sufficient, but where the state is pre-empted from providing 
relief or hearing a federal claim by federal law the Act will not bar a 
plaintiff from federal court.219 
 
 213 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). 
 214 Id. 
 215 May v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 508 F.2d 136, 137 (1974). 
 216 See discussion of Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000), infra PART 
V.A. 
 217 The Act has been construed as a jurisdictional bar to much more than claims 
for injunctive relief.  In Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 
(1981), the Court found that damage actions against the states for illegal taxation 
were also barred where plaintiffs could obtain a remedy at the state level.  A year 
later in California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982), the Court held the 
Act also presented a jurisdictional bar to actions for declaratory relief. 
 218 See Kohn v. Central Distrib. Co., Inc., 306 U.S. 531 (1939). 
 219 See E-Systems, Inc. v. Pogue, 929 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the 
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The few circuits that have considered the issue of whether the 
fees charged by the states are properly considered a tax under the 
TIA are split on the issue.220  The courts’ analyses turn on intent: 
whether the state is only attempting to recoup the cost of the disabled 
program or is attempting to use the charge to produce money for the 
state in excess of program costs.221  In the latter case the fee is a tax, in 
the former it is not.  These circuit decisions indicate that plaintiffs’ 
access to the Ex Parte Young remedy and actions in federal courts may 
be reduced or eliminated in states that charge fees in excess of the 
cost of the parking programs. 
A.  The Circuit Split on Whether Disabled Parking Program Fees are a 
Tax for the Purposes of the TIA. 
The Fifth,222 Ninth,223 and Tenth224 Circuits considered the issue 
of fees ranging from $4.00 to $5.25 per placard, and determined the 
fees are regulatory in nature rather than revenue generating.225  
Consequently, the courts held the TIA does not bar plaintiffs seeking 
relief from these fees from federal court.226  The key factor for each of 
these courts was that the fee charged by the state bore some 
relationship to the cost of the program and was not designed to raise 
revenue.  The reasoning in Hexom v. Oregon DOT, a Ninth Circuit 
case, is representative of all three opinions: 
The fee is not designed to raise revenue, and enjoining its 
collection will not threaten the flow of central revenues of 
Oregon’s government.  It is not at all critical to general state 
functions.  It is, instead, designed to pay for the costs of a special 
program.  In fine, it is not a tax, and this action is not precluded 
by the TIA.227 
 
existence of a state remedy to plaintiff’s claim was preempted by ERISA, and that the 
plaintiff’s claim therefore qualified as an exception to the Tax Injunction Act). 
 220 See supra PART III.A. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Neinast, 217 F.3d at 277. 
 223 Hexom v. Oregon DOT, 177 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 224 Marcus v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 1139 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “As the Texas statute 
applies the charges toward the cost of the program, the district court erred in 
holding that the placard funds were a tax and thus within the scope of the Tax 
Injunction Act.”  Neinast, 217 F.3d at 277 (finding that even though the fees were not 
earmarked to cover the costs of the parking programs, their size indicates that this is 
what they were intended for); see also Marcus, 170 F.3d at 1311. 
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In Hedgepeth v. Tennessee,228 the Sixth Circuit considered a much 
larger fee than that considered by the Fifth, Ninth, or Tenth Circuit.  
The court determined that the fees levied on disabled drivers were 
not merely intended to defray the administrative costs of Tennessee’s 
regulatory program, but were instead intended as a general revenue-
raising tax.229  The court, finding that none of the $20.50 that 
disabled drivers must pay to obtain a disabled driving permit (or any 
of the $3 charged to renew) went directly to the cost of the state’s 
regulatory program, determined that the charges were, in fact, taxes 
controlled by the TIA.230  Under the TIA, plaintiffs do not have 
standing to sue unless the state fails to provide a “plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy.”231  Because Tennessee law does not preclude the 
plaintiffs from bringing their claim before Tennessee’s Claims 
Commission, the court found the initial requirement of the TIA was 
satisfied because the Claims Commission proceeding equated to a 
“plain, speedy and efficient remedy.”232  This language, according to 
the court, meant the TIA required the plaintiffs first pursue their 
federally created right with the Claims Commission, then with the 
state courts, and if these failed, in federal court.233 
B.  Whether or Not the Fees Collected by the States Constitute a Tax, 
Plaintiffs Should be able to Prevent the States from Charging Such 
Fees 
It is clear that when states charge fees proportional to the cost of 
their disabled parking program activities, plaintiffs will be able to use 
Ex Parte Young to enforce the Regulation in federal court because 
these types of fees are not taxes for the purposes of the TIA.234  While 
states that charge fees much higher than the cost of their disabled 
parking program may be able to force plaintiffs into state remedial 
schemes, state decisions to single out the disabled as a source of 
revenue should actually provide disabled plaintiffs with damage 
actions in state court.  This remedy is available because state targeting 
of the disabled as a source of revenue constitutes the kind of 
irrational discrimination against the disabled discussed in Part I.  
 
 228 215 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 229 Id. at 612. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 616. 
 233 Id. 
 234 See supra PART V.A. 
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Thus, while the Hedgepeth logic235 might still prevent a plaintiff from 
bringing suit in federal court, plaintiffs forced out of federal court 
may be able to obtain an additional remedy in state court.  If Title II 
is a valid exercise of congressional power the states must, under the 
Supremacy Clause, enforce it in their own courts when the tax is 
challenged.236  Whether the states charge the disabled fees, or tax 
them as Tennessee and Massachusetts do,237 the disabled should 
ultimately be able to enjoin the states from charging them to 
participate in disabled parking programs.  Class action suits in state 
court should also provide an effective remedy for taxes already 
collected. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion demonstrates that all fifty states can 
ultimately be prohibited from charging the disabled fees to 
participate in disabled parking programs.  Although disabled 
individuals, pending the Courts ruling on whether Title II is a valid 
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, may not 
have direct enforcement actions for violations of the regulation, they 
should still be able to sue state officials for injunctive relief under Ex 
Parte Young.  This is because (1) Title II is a valid exercise of 
Commerce power; (2) Title II does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment; (3) the Regulation is a valid interpretation of Title II 
under the Chevron framework; and (4) while the TIA may bar some 
plaintiffs from seeking relief in federal court, if their state uses its 
disabled parking program to generate revenue, such plaintiffs will 
still be able to obtain relief in a state forum.  If the fees certain states 
charge are taxes—designed to generate revenue—the disabled in 
those states may be able to sue for violations of their Equal Protection 
Clause rights even without the protection afforded under the ADA.  
To be successful on this claim the disabled would have to show taxing 
those who participate in disabled parking programs amounts to 
irrational state discrimination against the disabled. 
While the states can be forced to comply with the Regulation as 
it regulates disabled parking programs, the states should put their 
 
 235 “The substantial difference between the actual cost of the permanent placard 
or license plate and the amount that must be paid to obtain one supports a 
conclusion that the assessment is for general revenue raising purposes.”  Hedgepeth, 
215 F.3d at 614. 
 236 State courts not only have the power to hear Title II actions, but are obligated 
to do so.  See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 237 Massachusetts charges its disabled drivers more than any other state: $25 for 
placards.  MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 2 (2001). 
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money where their policy is and stop charging such fees—even if not 
required to do so by a court order.  Disabled parking programs are in 
effect in all fifty states.  No state has challenged the requirement that 
they have disabled programs.  It follows that the states believe they 
should have such programs even if the ADA did not exist.  The states 
that force the disabled to pay in order to participate in disabled 
parking programs undermine their own policies of affirmatively 
acting to include the disabled in society.  This “pay to play” mentality 
marginalizes the disabled because it suggests that accommodating the 
disabled is not really an important goal and is only supportable when 
convenient to the rest of society—when they do not impact the state 
budget.  If disabled parking programs are important enough to 
enact, states should not tokenize the programs by forcing the 
disabled to fund the programs and certainly should not, as is current 
practice in several states, use the programs as general sources of 
revenue for the state. 
